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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Despite the popularity of the term among advocates of 
debt forgiveness, there is little agreement on a workable 
definition of “odious” debts and there are but few 
examples where the concept has been invoked in law to 
justify non-payment of sovereign debts. Most often, these 
have been cases when a successor state or government 
has refused to honor certain debts contracted by its 
predecessor state or government. Repudiating sovereign 
debts on broader grounds—such as that money may 
have been misused by the borrower or that results were 
not as hoped for at the outset of lending—would create 
real risks not only of reduced financial flows to poorer 
This paper—a product of the Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to analyze issues relevant to debt relief, debt sustainability, and debt 
management. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may 
be contacted at vnehru@worldbank.org and mthomas@worldbank.org.  
countries as a result of the danger of ex post challenges 
to lenders’ claims, but also of moral hazard and lack of 
project ownership. This paper presents a discussion of the 
extant legal and financial environment facing developing 
country sovereign borrowers and develops a proposed 
approach within this environment to address issues of 
concern underlying the concept of odious or illegitimate 
debt. The authors make the case for focusing attention on 
codes of conduct along the lines of the Equator Principles 
and on refining forward-looking attempts to increase aid 
effectiveness and recover stolen assets. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate on odious debts has grown in intensity in recent years, and not only in 
the international legal literature.
1 The concept has been invoked by some advocacy 
groups and civil society organizations in their manifestos for unilateral debt repudiation 
by developing countries. A few years ago, the concept was used as a possible justification 
for canceling the debts of post-Saddam Iraq. Yet, to different users, the expression 
“odious debts” may mean different things, largely because they use it to achieve different 
objectives. It is hardly surprising, then, that the participants in this debate tend to speak 
past each other. Within this context, the purpose of this discussion paper is modest:  
 
•  examine the main features of the traditional concept and categories of odious 
debts, and briefly examine whether a rule allowing the repudiation of odious debts 
may be said to have emerged in international law (Section II); 
•  consider recent attempts to expand the traditional concept and categories of 
odious debts, and ask whether they are sufficiently precise to contribute to the 
solution of the problems they are meant to address (Section III); and 
•  identify ways in which lenders and borrowers can address, or have indeed 
addressed, the underlying concerns to the concept of odious debts (Section IV). 
 
                                            
1   For example, The North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation held 
its seventh annual symposium, in February 2007, on the topic of odious debts, with the participation of 
academics and practitioners. As a result of this symposium, the Summer 2007 issue of that Journal was 
dedicated entirely to odious debts.  
- Page 2 -  
In other words, the modest objective of this discussion paper is to provide a 
summary of the terms of the debate on what remains a controversial subject and to 
examine how the underlying motivating forces driving the debate can be addressed in a 
constructive way. 
 
II.  TRADITIONAL CONCEPT AND CATEGORIES OF ODIOUS DEBTS 
 
In its initial use, the expression “odious debts” identified those debts that a state 
or a government had contracted with a view to attaining objectives that were prejudicial 
to the major interests of the successor state or government or of the local population. The 
debts thus identified are those contracted with an international legal subject (a state) 
under legal agreements governed by international law.
2 The issue of the existence of an 
international legal doctrine on odious debts can arise within the context of litigation both 
before international courts and arbitral tribunals and before national courts.
3 With respect 
to financial agreements governed by a national legal system, the question (which will not 
be addressed in this paper) is whether a national, as opposed to an international, doctrine 
on odious debts exists.
4  
                                            
2   A debt contracted by a state with a non-sovereign may give rise to an international claim through 
diplomatic protection, but this possibility will not be examined here. 
3   For this latter case, see, for example, the reference to the fact that “the [People’s Republic of 
China] asserted as a long-established principle of international law that ‘odious’ debts are not to be 
succeeded to… a view they continue to advance, but do not explicitly rely on, in making this motion to 
dismiss” in Marvin L. Morris, Jr., Plaintiff, against The People’s Republic of China, et al., Defendants. 
Gloria Bolanos Pons, et al., Plaintiffs, against The People’s Republic of China, et al., Defendants, United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 478 F. Supp. 2d 561; 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20784 (March 21, 2007, decided).  
4   Ashfaq Khalfan has written that, at present, “it is unclear whether the laws of England and of New 
York, properly interpreted, provide support for the ‘odious’ debt doctrine. Given the interest of these 
jurisdictions in maintaining their positions as key financial centers, their courts are likely to reject the 
‘odious’ debt doctrine.” (Sites and Strategic Legal Options for Addressing Illegitimate Debt, Advancing the 
“odious” Debt Doctrine [CISDL working paper], 71.) While an argument based on the doctrine of odious 
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The operational area of the traditional concept and categories of odious debts, 
unlike their expanded concept and categories that will be examined in Section III below, 
is the succession of states and governments. International law requires, as a rule, a 
successor government to honor the public debt of a predecessor regime.
5 However, if the 
question is not one of succession of governments but is one of succession of states, the 
law becomes uncertain. The extent to which a successor state is bound to honor the public 
debts of the replaced state is a matter of controversy. The solution reflected in the 1983 
Vienna Convention on succession of states in respect of state property, archives and 
debts,
6 providing for the passing of the public debt to the successor (unless it is a newly 
independent state) with a reduction according to an equitable proportion, is not immune 
from difficulties,
7 and may be part of the explanation why the Convention has not 
universally been accepted and has not yet entered into force. In any event, the assumption 
for the operation of a doctrine of odious debts is that, save for the application of this 
doctrine, the debt in question would be binding on the successor state or government.   
 
Historically, the theory of odious debts has mainly been developed in the writings 
of “Anglo-American jurists”.
8  For example, the well known English lawyer John 
Westlake discussed odious debts (even though without using this heading) in his treatise 
                                                                                                                                  
debts may not succeed in municipal courts, other arguments (which are as varied as the existing legal 
systems) may succeed in reaching the same result.  
5   See Oppenheim’s International Law. Peace (9
th edn. Jennings and Watts, 1992), vol. I, 205.  
6   Doc.A/CONF.117/14. The text of the Convention is electronically available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_3_1983.pdf. By the end of August 2007, 
only seven states had acceded to the Convention. 
7   See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6
th edn., 2003), 625-6.  
8   “Ninth report on succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties by Mr. Mohammed 
Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur – draft articles on succession in respect of State debts, with commentaries”, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1977, vol. II, Part 1), para. 115.  
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on international law at the beginning of the last century.
9 However, the name most often 
linked to the emergence of a doctrine of odious debts is that of Alexander Nahum Sack, 
who wrote in the 1920s on the subject, when he lived in Paris as a Russian expatriate. In 
his principal writing on the topic, Sack identified three categories of odious debts, namely 
(a) “regime debts” (when a despotic regime “contracts a debt, not for the needs and in the 
interest of the state, but to strengthen its own despotic regime”),
10 (b) “subjugation debts” 
(when the government “contracts debts to subjugate the population of part of its territory 
or to colonize it by members of the dominant nationality”),
11 and (c) “war debts” (when 
the government of a state contracts debts “with a view to waging war against another 
state”).
12 This tri-partition has proved helpful in the treatment of the topic by later writers 
and will therefore be adopted in this discussion paper as well.   
 
War/subjugation/regime debts     
 
There have been cases, in state practice, where a successor state has rejected war 
debts contracted by a predecessor state to sustain its war effort against the former. A case 
in point is the treatment of South Africa’s war debts when Great Britain annexed the 
Transvaal in 1900, after the Boer War. The Crown Counsel, in their opinion to the 
Colonial office, denied the existence of any international legal principle that would 
compel the British Government to recognize obligations incurred during the war or in 
                                            
9   Westlake, International Law. Part I. Peace (2
nd edn., 1910), 78-83. 
10   “Si un pouvoir despotique contracte une dette non pas pour les besoins et dans l’intérêt de l’Etat, 
mais pour fortifier son régime despotique”, in Sack, Les Effets des transformations des états sur leurs 
dettes publiques et autres obligations financiers. Traité juridique et financier (1927), 157. 
11   “Lorsque le gouvernement contracte des dettes afin d’asservir la population d’une partie de son 
territoire ou de colonizer celle-ci par des ressortissants de la nationalité dominante”, ibid., 158. 
12   “Ce sont les dettes conclues par le gouvernement de l’Etat en vue d’une guerre avec un autre 
Etat”, ibid., 165. 
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contemplation of the war. However, there have also been cases in the opposite direction 
where, for considerations of political expedience, successor states have assumed the war 
debts of predecessor states, such as the assumption of a percentage of the Austrian war 
debts by the former Czechoslovakia after the First World War.
13 This uneven practice has 
induced such an attentive observer as Feilchenfeld to doubt whether a specific 
international customary rule has emerged exempting war debts from assumption in the 
case of annexation or dismemberment.
14    
The classic case of rejection of a subjugation debt is the repudiation, by the 
United States, of the Cuban debts contracted by Spain allegedly on the ground that they 
had been imposed on Cuba against its will and that they had not been contracted for 
Cuba’s benefit, but only to keep Cuba under Spanish domination and to suppress Cuba’s 
war of independence. In opposition to this claim, Spain made the argument that these 
debts had been contracted on behalf and for the benefit of Cuba and, indeed, had 
contributed to the island’s economic development. The 1898 Treaty of Peace, which 
ended the dispute, seemed to uphold the United States argument, in that neither the 
United States nor Cuba assumed the subjugation debts contracted by Spain. However, in 
this case too (as in the case of war debts), the view that a successor State should be 
relieved of responsibility for any debt contracted by a predecessor State to subjugate a 
territory did not go unchallenged. For example, Frantz Despagnet remarked in 1905, 
commenting on the affaire of the Cuban debts, that this view “opens the way to all 
manner of disputes as to the utility of expenditure incurred by the dismembered country 
                                            
13   For the cases of the South African and Austrian war debts, and other instances from state practice, 
see Bedjaoui’s “Ninth Report”, paras. 141 to 156. 
14   Feilchenfeld, Public Debts and State Succession (1931), 718-21.  
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for the portion that is separated from it; it encourages the most arbitrary and most 
iniquitous solutions.”
15 Nor has the practice of states been consistent in its application. 
For instance, while declaring its readiness to assume certain debts before the Dutch 
capitulation to Japan on March 8, 1942 (Java), and April 7, 1942 (Sumatra), Indonesia 
refused to assume various debts after those dates, especially those resulting from Dutch 
military operations against the Indonesian national liberation movement. At a Round 
Table Conference in 1949, Indonesia and The Netherlands agreed on a formula of debt 
apportionment that departed from the principle of repudiation of subjugation debts.
16 
While the agreement reflecting this apportionment was later denounced by Indonesia, it 
remains questionable whether a customary international rule allowing the repudiation of 
subjugation debts really exists.  
As a rule, arguments based on the non-enforceability of war and subjugation debts 
have been used within the context of state succession. The case of regime debts is 
different. The argument here is that, despite the continuity of the state, there has been a 
change in government and the successor government refuses to honor the debts 
contracted by the predecessor regime on account of their having been contracted in the 
exclusive interest of the predecessor regime, and not to the benefit of the state or its 
population. The traditional example is that of the loans extended by the Royal Bank of 
Canada to Frederico Tinoco, a former Secretary of War of Costa Rica who, at the time of 
the loans in question, was the head of the Costa Rican government, after having 
                                            
15   Despagnet, Cours de droit international public (3
rd edn., 1905), 111, quoted in English translation 
in Bedjaoui’s “Ninth Report”, para. 165. Despagnet’s original French text reads as follows: “Cette manière 
de voir ouvre la voie à toutes les contestations sur le caractère utile des dépenses faites pour le pays 
démembré pour la portion qui est détachée de lui; elle favorise les solutions les plus arbitraires et les plus 
iniques.” 
16   On the Cuban and Indonesian subjugation debts, see Bedjaoui’s “Ninth Report”, paras. 157 to 170. 
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overthrown the previous government in 1917. Tinoco’s government lasted two years, and 
the loans were contracted in the months before he left the country. Great Britain started 
arbitral proceedings against Costa Rica to force the new Costa Rican government to 
honor Tinoco’s debts. The sole arbitrator (William Howard Taft, a former US President 
and, at the time of the arbitration, the US Chief Justice) held that the transactions 
involving Tinoco were “full of irregularities” and that the Royal Bank of Canada knew 
that the money would benefit only Tinoco, not the state or the people of Costa Rica. The 
new Costa Rican government was therefore right in declining its responsibility for the 
repayment of the loans.
17 In this arbitral award, there was no recognition of any 
international customary norm allowing a successor government to repudiate the debts 
contracted for personal gain by the predecessor government. Rather, there was a factual 
analysis of the irregular transactions and the consideration that the lender knew of the use 
of the funds.    
 
Is there an international legal norm on “odious” debts?  
 
Treaties of peace and other international agreements may have indirectly 
recognized the claims of successor states to repudiate war and subjugation debts, but they 
have not led to any codification treaty embodying a general rule on odious debts. The 
International Law Commission (a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General 
Assembly entrusted with the task of codifying and progressively developing international 
law) was faced with a proposal to include an article on odious debts in its draft articles on 
                                            
17   Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica, 1 United Nations Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards (1923), 369. 
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the succession of states in respect of state property, archives and debts, which draft 
articles were the basis for the international conference that adopted the 1983 Vienna 
Convention mentioned above. However, having discussed the proposed articles presented 
by its Special Rapporteur (Mohammed Bedjaoui, who would later become President of 
the International Court of Justice), the Commission concluded that “the rules formulated 
for each type of succession of States might well settle the issues raised by the question 
and might dispose of the need to draft general provisions on it.”
18 Without entering into 
the details of this conclusion, it will be sufficient to note here that the International Law 
Commission (a) declined a request to adopt a draft article on odious debts, and (b) in 
doing so, remarked that the practical issues that the concept of odious debts is intended to 
address could be settled in other ways. 
  
A similar conclusion can be reached regarding the question of whether a rule on 
odious debts has developed in the other main source of international law besides treaty, 
namely international custom.
19  International law distinguishes mere usages from 
customs. A usage is a practice that does not reflect a legal obligation, such as the 
ceremonial tradition of saluting at sea. A custom, on the other hand, is a consistent and 
general practice (the objective element of custom) accompanied by a sense of legal 
                                            
18   “Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-first session”, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission (1979, vol. II, Part 2), para. 43.  
19   For the limited purposes of this discussion paper, there is no need to examine the third source of 
international law listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, namely the 
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”. In the committee of jurists that prepared the 
Statute (for what, at the time, was the Permanent Court of International Justice) there was no consensus on 
the meaning of this phrase. Moreover, despite occasional references to general principles (sometimes co-
mingled with equitable considerations; e.g., Howse, 2007) in the legal literature on odious debts, there is 
hardly any sustained effort to investigate a plurality of national legal systems (assuming such principles 
have their origin in national law) with a view to showing that the exception to the repayment of odious 
debts is indeed a “general principle of law recognized by civilized nations”.  
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obligation (the subjective element of custom, called opinio juris). By comparison with 
treaty law, a distinctive feature of custom is its general sphere of validity, whereby a 
customary norm (other than a local custom) is binding on all states, except for those that 
have objected to it since its very inception (the so-called principle of the “persistent 
objecto
20   
l law to the operation of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda on treaty compliance.
21 
investigating the question whether there is a recognized legal doctrine of odious debts in 
                                           
r”).
 
In the case of odious debts, there have undoubtedly been instances, such as the 
ones mentioned above, in which war, subjugation or regime debts have been repudiated 
and found not to be transferable to a successor state or government. However, it is highly 
doubtful whether these instances have amounted to a general practice and whether the 
states and governments concerned have acted with the conviction of following a legally 
binding rule. In other words, it is questionable whether the two constitutive elements of 
international custom, i.e. general practice and opinio juris, have materialized in the case 
of an alleged international customary rule on “odious” debts or, better, an exception 
based on customary internationa
 
This is also the conclusion reached by two practitioners who, while recently 
 
20   On the principle of the “persistent objector”, and the question whether it applies also to norms of 
jus cogens, see Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (1997), 59-72. 
21   Article 26 (pacta sunt servanda) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties reads as 
follows: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.” The Vienna Convention entered into force in 1980. Its text is electronically available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
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customary international law, have concluded that “neither the threshold for state practice 
nor opinio juris have been met.”
22 
 
  A fortiori, the attempts that have been made to link odious debts to the invalidity 
of treaties for the violation of norms of jus cogens remain controversial. Pursuant to 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (an article which is regarded 
by many as reflecting customary international law, and therefore binding on all states), a 
treaty is void if it is in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus 
cogens), namely a norm “accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”
23 What would be the norm, the derogation from which would determine the 
nullity of a financial agreement extending an odious debt? Obviously not an international 
norm on odious debts which, as was noted above, is hardly an international customary 
norm, let alone a norm “accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole” (an expression implying a higher burden of proof). If, on the other 
hand, the norm in question were meant to be one of the classic examples of jus cogens 
(such as the prohibition of genocide or acts of aggression), the difficult task, to be 
                                            
22   Yianni and Tinkler, “Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious Debts?”, 32 The North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 749 (2007), at 771. In a 2007 
monograph headed Uncostitutional Regimes and the Validity of Sovereign Debt. A Legal Perspective, 
Sabine Michalowski observed that “the doctrine of odious debts as a principle of international law stands 
on rather weak ground” (at 45, footnote omitted), though, according to the same author, “the arguments 
invoked in favour of the odiousness of large parts of the debt of developing countries are important in order 
to raise awareness of the fact that many of the loans which contributed to the debt problem of the 
developing world stem from morally and legally questionable operations” (at 67).  
23   Article 64 of the same Vienna Convention embodies the principle of jus cogens superveniens: “If 
a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with 
that norm becomes void and terminates.” 
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assessed on the specific circumstances of each case, would remain of establishing a link 
between such a norm and the financial agreement in question. This leads to the 
conclusion that the class of debts that could be classified as odious because of the 
derogation of a norm of jus cogens would be narrow indeed, if existing at all.  
 
Weaknesses in declaring ex ante that certain regimes are “odious” 
 
A different proposal that has recently been put forward, and which constitutes a 
convenient bridge between the traditional and the expanded concept of odious debts, is to 
have some internationally accepted entity or individual(s) to declare ex ante that certain 
regimes are “odious”.
24 This would put lenders on notice that loans to such regimes could 
be repudiated by successor regimes with the support of the international community 
unless, of course, the lender could demonstrate that due diligence had been used to ensure 
the loan proceeds were used for legitimate purposes. But even such a seemingly 
appealing approach has many weaknesses. First, who — individual, group, agency, or 
institution — would declare ex ante that regimes are “odious”? Second, on which 
decisive factors would this arbiter distinguish “odious” from non-odious regimes: 
unrepresentative government, ethnic cleansing, racial discrimination, denial of 
fundamental human rights? Third, how would such declarations be treated in national 
courts having jurisdiction to resolve debt disputes? Although, as one writer has recently 
                                            
24   See Jayachandran and Kremer, “Odious Debt”, 96 The American Economic Review 82 (2006), 
electronically available at 
www.stanford.edu/~jayachan/odious_debt.pdf#search=%22Jayachandran%20Kremer%20%22odious%20d
ebt%22%22. 
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put it, the problems with the ex ante model “may outweigh its advantages”,
25 there is of 
course nothing preventing governments (as has indeed happened) from imposing 
sanctions on, and prohibiting lending to, regimes that they consider “odious”, either 





Three conclusions may be drawn from the analysis developed in this section. 
First, the traditional concept of odious debts is not open-ended but is instead restricted to 
easily identifiable categories (war, subjugation, and regime debts), discussed within the 
context of the succession of states or of governments. Second, even within these strict 
limits, no customary international rule (let alone a norm of jus cogens) allowing the 
repudiation of odious debts seems to have emerged from the scattered instances of state 
practice and arbitral decisions, nor has any codification treaty embodied an exception 
based on the odiousness of the debt.. Third, proposals to declare ex ante that certain 
                                            
25   King, “Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate”, 32 The North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation 605 (2007), at 659. This writer identifies three main problems with this 
approach: “The first problem is that such an institution [entrusted with the task of designating certain 
regimes ex-ante as “odious”] will likely designate very few regimes as odious… A second problem is that 
declaring a regime, rather than a set of actions, to be odious is a rather ‘nuclear’ type of option and is 
unlikely to be deployed until the regime reaches pariah status… Both the first and second problems lead 
inexorably to the third, and indeed perhaps the most significant problem: if a given regime is not so 
designated, a creditor can rely on this fact in lending to it. In other words, and quite ironically, the idea of 
calling this model the ‘due diligence’ model is highly misleading. It would eliminate the need for any 
diligence at all.” (Ibid., 659-60.)  
26   Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council can take, pursuant to its powers in the area 
of peace and security, decisions binding on states. On this ground, the Security Council has decided on 
economic sanctions and prohibited states from undertaking certain financial transactions with targeted 
states. However, even in such rare instances, all the Security Council can do is create a legal obligation for 
states not to enter into financial transactions. The authority of the Security Council does not extend to 
rendering invalid such transactions. In other words, non-compliance by a state with a Security Council’s 
prohibition to enter into a financial transaction would trigger the international responsibility of such a state, 
but not the invalidity of the financial transaction in question. 
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regimes are “odious” have their own weaknesses, some practical and some conceptual, 
and have consequently attained little traction. It is therefore not surprising that Iraq and 
South Africa, just to take two recent examples of countries with new governments that 
inherited large sovereign debts, chose not to repudiate those debts unilaterally on grounds 
that they were “odious”, but instead chose to negotiate a debt restructuring with their 
creditors.
27    
 
*******
                                            
27   The reference to these two cases is limited to the fact of the final decision to negotiate a debt 
restructuring as opposed to repudiate “odious debts” unilaterally. These decisions were obviously the result 
of the specific circumstances prevailing in these two countries (as is always the case for such decisions), 
which need not be analyzed here.  
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III.  EXPANDED CONCEPT AND CATEGORIES OF ODIOUS DEBTS 
 
While the debate on the traditional concept of odious debts focused on whether 
debt obligations may be repudiated by successor states or governments under exceptional 
circumstances, recent decades have seen a rising chorus of demands by non-
governmental and civil society organizations to apply the concept of odious debts to new 
and different sub-categories. The objectives behind these demands are as different as the 
groups advancing them. Some may be seeking a legal basis for the cancellation of debt 
owed by developing countries. Others may want to punish international lenders for what 
they see as irresponsible and reckless lending. And yet others could be keen to suppress 
“odious” regimes by starving them of the flow of capital.
28 
 
There are several respects in which the revived concept of odious debts and its 
newly articulated sub-categories differ from the traditional concept and categories that 
have just been examined. First, the limited setting of succession of state or government 
has been abandoned, with the consequence that the new concept is advocated in the case 
also of state or governmental continuity. Second, instead of a case-by-case analysis of 
individual loans with a view to determining whether they have given rise to odious debts, 
there is a tendency to proceed to an overall assessment not so much of the financial 
transactions in question as of the “odious” nature of the borrower (i.e. there would be 
                                            
28   These three examples do not exhaust the universe of motivations. Other examples include those 
who may be looking for a legal defense to protect themselves against creditors seeking repayment, or those 
attempting to carve a role for themselves as international arbiters of disputes between international 
creditors and sovereign borrowers.  
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“odious” debtors rather than “odious” debts).
29 (Such an extension rests in part on the 
concept of fungibility, namely that loans ostensibly provided for one purpose can release 
monies already allocated for that purpose to be used for an entirely different purpose, 
with or without the knowledge of the lender.) Third, greater emphasis is placed on the 
lender’s actual or presumed knowledge (and ensuing accountability) of how the borrowed 
funds will be used by the borrower. Fourth, unlike the traditional concept and categories 
of odious debts considered above, there is no appeal to any international customary rule 
that would justify the new concept and categories, the stress being rather on the moral or 
political unacceptability of repayment.    
 
This expanded concept of odious debts and its various sub-categories can be 
found in some of the international literature and in advocacy materials produced by 
various non-governmental organizations. But these documents often lack the precision 
necessary to allow for a meaningful debate. For example, sometimes within the same 
article, the epithet “odious” is ascribed to lenders, regimes, countries, or debts. And 
within these writings one can identify different categories of odiousness. For reasons of 
convenience, this paper has chosen to focus on three — “criminal”, “unfair”, and 
“ineffective” debts.
30 While it is not easy to find a common thread that connects them, 
the term “illegitimate” is sometimes used as a term encompassing all these categories. (At 
other times, however, this term is described in a category of its own.) 
 
                                            
29   See the paragraph on declarations ex ante, in Section II above.  
30     While the present investigation is restricted to these three categories, the literature has spawned 
several other categories of odious debts, including “unpayable” debts, “onerous” debts, “unsustainable” 
debts, “dubious” debts, “honorific” debts, etc. 
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“Illegitimate debt” is, according to the definition provided by Hanlon, a debt “that 
the borrower cannot be required to repay because the original loan or conditions attached 
to that loan infringed the law or public policy, or because they were unfair, improper, or 
otherwise objectionable.”
31 The key implication of this strand of argument is that it 
imposes a greater measure of legal responsibility on creditors, even when creditors do not 
have the power or the authority to control the borrowers’ actions once the loan is 
disbursed. It is such considerations that have led to the concept of “know your client” in 
retail and commercial banking, and requires lenders to guard against reckless behavior.
32  
 
“Criminal” debts    
 
  The category of “criminal” debts encompasses loans that involve corruption and 
kickbacks. Proponents of this category argue that debt repayments by a country are unjust 
when the original loans to their governments are stolen by officials or businessmen, or 
where the debt is incurred to rescue an economy ravaged by corruption. In contrast, 
domestic financial transactions or loans that are misused as a result of corruption are 
considered to be completely different and do not fall within this category. They are 
                                            
31     Hanlon, “Defining ‘illegitimate debt’: when creditors should be liable for improper loans”, in 
Jochnick and Preston (eds.), Sovereign Debt at the Crossroads: Challenges and Proposals for Resolving 
the Third World Debt Crisis (2006), 125. In another paper, Hanlon has defined “illegitimate debt” as “loans 
which are so bad that by making them a bank has failed in its fiduciary responsibilities, and has no right to 
collect on those loans.” (Wolfowitz, the World Bank, and Illegitimate Lending, 13 Brown Journal of World 
Affairs 41 [2007].)  
32   Patricia Adams (2005) writes: “Already, private sector financiers are careful to establish their due 
diligence and evidentiary basis to defend today’s loans in future.” Letters to the Editor, Finance and 
Development, Vol. 42: No. 2, June. It should also be noted, however, that much sovereign lending takes the 
form of more generalized financial support, whether through general budget support from official lenders 
or bond financing on international capital markets: in these cases the issue of the use of funds is obviously 
rendered rather vague.  
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instead categorized as purely domestic affairs that are consequently the subject of 
national law and domestic legal procedures. 
 
An essential ingredient of this line of reasoning is that international lenders should 
be made wholly or partly responsible for the fiscal burden of the misuse of the loan if 
either (a) they were aware in advance that a part of the loan would be illegally siphoned 
off, or (b) they had the leverage to prevent (or at least greatly diminish) the illegal misuse 
of such loans. 
 
Attractive as the above line of argument may seem, various considerations 
weaken it. First, once a loan is committed and disbursed by a lender to a sovereign 
borrower, any subsequent transaction between the sovereign and any other national unit, 
entity, or individual is, as a rule, a domestic financial transaction subject to national laws 
and legal procedures and is therefore usually outside the reach of international law. From 
this, it follows that the fiscal burden of any loss should be borne by the country, with the 
accompanying incentive on the country’s law enforcement institutions to recover such 
losses from the corrupt perpetrators causing the loss.
33  
 
Second, proponents of the concept of “criminal” debts are often unclear whether 
the required prior knowledge of lenders (as a necessary condition) should be with respect 
to any individual loan or more broadly to the financial climate within a country. Thus, 
while lenders may know that corruption exists in a country, they may not have any 
                                            
33   The point of the importance of incentives can be made the other way round: if any obligation to 
repay is rendered null by the misuse of funds, could this not create incentives for said misuse? 
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concrete knowledge in advance of plans to siphon proceeds from any individual loan 
(indeed such ignorance would appear highly likely, given that corrupt officials are not in 
the habit of advertising their intention to conduct an illegal activity). This raises the 
question of the burden imposed on creditors of the information they need to have in order 
to be held responsible for any wrongful act. For example, within the context of state-to-
state relations, the International Law Commission has written, in its commentary on draft 
article 16 on state responsibility, that a state “providing material or financial assistance or 
aid to another State does not normally assume the risk that its assistance or aid may be 
used to carry out an internationally wrongful act.”
34 The relevant point here is that it is 
not presumed knowledge, but actual knowledge, that may trigger responsibility. 
 
Third, the proponents of the concept of “criminal” debts do not clarify how one 
can assess the lender’s ability to influence the borrower’s actions, and therefore the extent 
to which an international lender can be held responsible for the alleged corruption of the 
nationals of the borrowing country.
35  
 
                                            
34   Para. (4) of the commentary on draft article 16 (Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, 2001), electronically available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. 
35   Overstating the “policy reach” of lenders to sovereigns is not a phenomenon limited to the debate 
about the legitimacy of debts; and this can lead to inconsistencies. For example, the debate around the 
concept of “conditionality” often reflects an assumption of a particularly strong form of conditionality on 
the part of its opponents, in which the lender exerts an extremely high degree of control over the borrower’s 
actions. Ironically, when such control is not exerted and bad outcomes follow – for example in the case of 
“criminal” debts – greater control by lenders is then deemed not only feasible but also desirable. 




The category of “unfair” debts would include a wide variety of debts which have 
either been incurred for activities considered inappropriate, or which contain 
unacceptable conditions, such as usurious interest rates or policy demands inconsistent 
with the borrower’s national law.
36 (The international law equivalent would be lending 
that would violate the purposes and principles contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the United 
Nations Charter, including such all-encompassing principles as the prohibition of 
aggression, the protection of fundamental human rights, and self–determination.) 
 
In the context of national law, it should be noted that courts have determined that 
repayment demands can be considered illegal on the grounds that the terms of the original 
loan were usurious, that the lenders perpetrated fraud on the borrowers, or that the lenders 
broke other national laws in order to extend the loan. 
   
                                            
36   E.g., Jubilee (UK) refer on their website to “debts that a country can’t afford to repay without 
meeting its people’s basic needs;… debt on unfair terms, such as very high interest rates; and debts 
contracted illegally, where proper processes weren’t gone through” (www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk). 
We therefore use the term “unfair” here to cover a variety of categories from the literature, not all of which 
themselves use this term, but where the implication is clear. 
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“Ineffective” debts 
 
Finally, the category of “ineffective” debts can be defined to be that of loans that 
do not reach their developmental purpose and loans directly linked to capital flight. This 
line of argument differs from the previous two in that it recognizes that projects could fail 
and development purposes of loans may not be reached even when there is no corruption 
and all applicable national and international laws are followed. 
 
Such a line of argument needs careful scrutiny, for its equivalent would be that 
domestic lenders to private borrowers should not be repaid when commercial projects 
fail. This, of course, is not the usual practice in most financial systems. On the contrary, 
when commercial projects fail on account of commercial risk, bankruptcy laws almost 
without exception require that lenders be among the first ones to be repaid (after all 
production costs and arrears to suppliers have been met). Indeed, from a financial 
perspective this is the defining characteristic of debt contracts, as opposed to other 
financial contracts, such as equity participation. In international lending, especially to 
poor countries for developmental purposes, the risks of failure are just as high, if not 
higher, than those faced in private transactions. If one thing has been learnt from the post-
war experience of international cooperation, it is that development finance is a risky 
enterprise in which a certain degree of project failure is inevitable given the multiplicity 
of the challenges poor countries face. It is faulty logic to suppose that one can secure only 
those development successes that all agree are crucial without taking the risks that entail 
failure from time to time. 
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But there is more to the question of lender responsibility than realism about 
outcomes. National financial laws do not require lenders to pay the costs for project 
failure for two reasons: first, the act of lending usually cannot be considered the 
proximate cause of the failure of the project or activity, under any scenario; second, and 
more important, it could potentially create incentives for irresponsible behavior by 
borrowers (so-called “moral hazard”), because the costs would be born by the lenders. In 
economic terms, debt contracts are “incentive compatible” with maximizing the chances 
of project success, because they make those responsible for project execution – the 
borrowers – the sole beneficiaries, at the margin, of that success. 
 
Another line of argument for declaring “ineffective” debts as “odious” derives 
from a more sophisticated line of reasoning. The essence of this argument rests on the 
principle that advisers to governments should be held legally accountable for their advice, 
and that failed projects are sometimes the result of poor advice provided by the lender. 
Where loans and advice are bundled together, the liability of the adviser for a failed 
project should be the non-payment of the loan itself. 
 
However, upon examination, even this more sophisticated line of reasoning is 
subject to many of the same shortcomings as above. First, finding the advisers to be 
responsible for the failure would require isolating their advice from the more general 
context of the country’s circumstances and identify it as the sole or even the main cause 
of the failure. Second, even if it can be established that the advisors are responsible for 
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giving poor advice, there is little logic to suggest that this should result necessarily in 
refusing loan repayments. There are no contracts which underwrite advisory services with 
loan non-payment. Third, a legal system making advisers culpable for failure (i.e. 
considering them to have undertaken an obligation of result — “obligation de résultat” — 
rather than an obligation of means — “obligation de moyens”) would prevent any 
delivery of technical advice, especially if that technical advice is provided for free or as 
part of a broader aid package (much as making non-payment an outcome of financing a 
failed project would lead to a drying up of development finance: see below). And, fourth, 
the incentive structure of such a possibility still exacerbates the dangers of “moral 
hazard”, because it would encourage the reckless use of loans if there is a sense that the 
cost of failure would be borne by others. 
 
  Conclusion 
 
  It is difficult to infer, from the wide literature on the topic, a clear concept of 
odious debts in the expanded versions in which the term is used today. The categories 
that are proposed often overlap, they lack clarity, and they tend to apply the concept with 
equal facility and often at the same time to loans, regimes, countries, and debts. This lack 
of precision, and the array of practical objections that confront them, make it difficult to 
accept an expanded concept of odious debts based on current proposals, although such 
conceptual expansion has often been advanced in recent discourse (while it has not been 
reflected in the practice of states). 
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It is important to establish what such a rejection does and does not imply. There is 
no doubt that on occasion, lenders, whether through a lack of diligence or a 
misunderstanding of the needs of the borrower, contribute to poor outcomes in the 
sovereign states they finance. Independent evaluation of impact, quality-at-entry 
assessments, and operational safeguards all exist to minimize this risk but can equally be 
taken as evidence that the risk is real. The key element of the approach proposed by 
proponents of an expanded odious debt doctrine is that in some subset of these cases 
borrowers ought to repudiate their debts, that they should be provided with a new legal 
basis for doing so, or that they should do so at the determination of some newly created 
international arbiter. 
 
That such a system could be set up is not at issue; its likely consequences are, 
however, the crux of the debate. As set out above, there are very clear reasons why much 
finance – including development finance to sovereign states – is provided in the form of 
debt. The reflows from successful repayments allow a leveraging of the scarce overseas 
development assistance provided by donors, vital if the millennium development goals 
are not to remain an illusion for many countries. Lenders’ systems need to provide 
maximum due diligence to make sure that funds lent contribute to success in the 
borrowing country. But just as fundamentally, debt contracts keep the bulk of the 
incentives for success where they should be, at the level of the use of the funds provided, 
which means at the level of the borrower. It may be that there is scope for other forms of 
financial contracts within the architecture of development finance – for example, greater 
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equity stakes taken by international institutions in certain projects – to better align the 
incentives for success when borrowers may not be the main parties involved in project 
execution. But such an assertion is a long way from encouraging the repudiation of 
contracts, something that as a general policy prescription is not the way to build an 
investment climate propitious for economic growth and social development. 
 
Of equal concern are the likely effects of a legalistic approach to odious debts on 
development finance. Lenders’ ability to keep providing finance to poor countries, 
whether in the official sector or the private sector, depends on their balance sheets, 
present and future. Lenders would be obliged to “price in” the future possibility that their 
loans would at some undetermined point in the future, and possibly despite their best 
efforts, be declared odious. The likely effects on the flows of finance to developing 
countries are not hard to discern.
37 This would be doubly counterproductive at a time 
when donor countries are aiming to increase – not decrease – financial flows to the 
poorest nations in pursuit of the millennium development goals. 
 
A different approach is therefore required to address the concerns that motivate 
many of the proposals that are grouped under the banner of odious debts. The various 




                                            
37   See e.g., Rajan (2004) for a compelling account on this topic. 
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IV. IMPROVING LENDING AND BORROWING PRACTICES 
The proponents of the expanded concept of odious debts, which was discussed in 
the previous section, argue that lenders must be held accountable for “illegitimate” debts. 
The underlying objectives for such a proposition are in principle laudable, as they aim at 
ensuring that international lending to developing countries (a) diminishes corruption (or, 
at the very least, does not encourage it), (b) is conducted in accordance with national and 
international laws, and (c) is used effectively for developmental purposes. A further 
objective may be to provide some legal support for the unilateral repudiation of debts by 
sovereign borrowers. 
The previous section has argued, however, that taking lenders to court to force 
them to meet these objectives runs into various problems, most serious among which is 
the risk of disrupting international financial flows to developing countries altogether. 
There are other means by which the same objectives can be met, and it may be more 
appropriate to focus on these. Should these measures be found to be insufficient, the best 
approach does not seem to be the conversion of uncertain concepts and categories into 
law but rather the rigorous identification of the problem, the assessment whether even 
partial answers to the problem already exist – and, if not, the search for reasonable 
solutions in the interest of borrowers and lenders alike - and the continued healthy 
functioning of the international financial system.  
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Fighting corruption in international lending 
Perhaps, the most important factor motivating the call for the cancellation of 
odious debts is the conviction that loan proceeds are often embezzled by corrupt officials 
and leaders in the borrowing countries, leaving it to future administrations and 
generations to pay back the debts having received none of their benefits. Such corrupt 
practices deserve not only moral outrage but also a thoughtful reaction on how to deal 
with them most effectively. In addition to what can be done by national governments, 
elected bodies, and civil society organizations within countries (which are all essential 
components of the equation), external lenders too can commit to follow good lending 
practices that may help remedy the problem over time. Not least among such practices is 
to assess the pecuniary and non-pecuniary risks of lending, to disclose these fully to 
shareholders as well as to the borrower, and to develop ways to mitigate these risks such 
that the probability of the loan being misused is minimized. For example, lenders could, 
among other things, implement the following measures: 
•  Examine the overall governance standards in the borrowing country, including 
anti-corruption programs and measures.  
•  Projects considered at high risk of corruption could be required to include anti-
corruption action plans that build on knowledge gained from the experience of 
implementing previous projects, and which draw on tried-and-tested 
requirements for transparency and oversight, possibly including enhanced 
disclosure provisions, civil society oversight, complaint-handling mechanisms, 
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policies to reduce opportunities for collusion, mitigation of fraud and forgery 
risks, and specified sanctions and remedies. 
•  Well publicized mechanisms need to be put in place that allow the public – and 
internal “whistleblowers” – to come forward if they have allegations of 
corruption, with adequate safeguards to protect them against possible reprisals. 
Such allegations will need to be investigated thoroughly by the lender as well as 
the borrowing authorities, in full conformity with national laws and regulations. 
Any evidence emerging from investigations of wrongdoing should be made 
public and handed over to authorities for appropriate action consistent with the 
laws and regulations of the country concerned. 
•  As a form of protection against the possibility that covenants in loan agreements 
may be breached and loan proceeds may not be used for their intended purposes, 
lenders should reserve the right to cancel part of the loan and seek reimbursement 
of any funds that have been misused. In addition, those found guilty should be 
prosecuted by the borrower governments to the full extent under national law. 
•  Mechanisms need to be put in place for the debarment of firms and individuals 
that are found to be participating in fraud and corruption. Every effort should be 
expended by governments and the international community to recover stolen 
government assets, including money stolen from sovereign loans. Not only could 
lenders and borrowers publicize instances of fraud and corruption and the 
remedial measures taken, but at the same time join forces to develop systems that 
make such crimes harder to commit. 
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The above examples of good lending practices can be complemented by new 
initiatives to strengthen the array of anti-corruption measures that countries can 
implement, such as the Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) initiative of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank. In recent years, countries as 
diverse as Nigeria, Peru, and the Philippines have enjoyed some success in securing the 
repatriation of assets stolen by their corrupt former leaders. Success, however, has been 
neither easy nor quick. To help developing countries seeking to recover stolen assets 
more easily and effectively, the UNODC and the World Bank have jointly developed the 
StAR initiative. This initiative expands the ambit of traditional support to improve 
governance and anti-corruption practices within countries and brings in the “other side of 
the equation”: stolen assets are frequently hidden in developed country financial centers, 
and often include bribes paid by multinational corporations. This initiative will help the 
countries that are parties to it to implement the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC), which entered into force in 2005 as the first global anticorruption 
agreement.
38 It will also develop pilot programs to help specific countries recover the 
stock of stolen assets by providing needed technical assistance while also supporting 
improvements in public financial management, investigative capacity and fiscal 
transparency to prevent future looting. Finally, StAR aims at helping countries ensure 
that recovered assets are used effectively in support of development through monitoring 
programs with the voluntary agreement of the countries concerned. 
 
                                            
38   The text of the Convention is electronically available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html. 
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Ensuring the “fairness” of loans 
 
Just as lenders can play an important pro-active role in protecting their loans from 
fraud and corruption, they could also exercise appropriate due diligence to ensure that the 
loans themselves are the results of processes and procedures consistent with the laws of 
the borrowing country and expected good practice according to international standards. 
These include: 
•  Providing ample opportunities within the country to comment on, criticize, and 
shape the proposed loan, and stressing a country representative’s freedom to 
decline the loan throughout its preparation, appraisal, and approval process. 
•  Subjecting loans to intensive preparation, evaluation, appraisal, and negotiation, 
with full participation by the authorities of the country concerned and, as and 
where appropriate, by civil society and other relevant groups, and disclosing to 
the public the final appraisal documents. Depending on the applicable laws, 
regulations, and procedures, this could include scrutiny by elected representative 
bodies. 
•  Requiring legal opinions regularly, from acceptable counsel, confirming that the 
loan agreement in question is legally binding in accordance with its terms and has 
been approved in conformity with the internal laws and procedures of the 
borrowing country.  
 
Of course, such steps could raise the cost of loan preparation, and this could prove to be a 
disincentive for lenders (and borrowers, if it raises the cost of borrowing). On the other 
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hand, these increased costs of loan preparation may be seen as an investment in obtaining 
potential benefits: for the borrower, better use of the loan proceeds, and, for the lender, a 
lower risk of default on the loan. 
 
Improving the effectiveness of loans 
 
To meet the concerns that underlie proposals to declare “ineffective” debts as 
odious, lending institutions could adopt a variety of measures. Before considering these, 
it is worth reiterating one point: as a rule, loan agreements do not create a link between 
the final success of the loan proceeds and the borrower’s repayment obligation. The 
reason is simple. One of the key aspects of international lending to sovereigns is the 
borrower’s “ownership” and complete control of the use of the proceeds and the 
acknowledgment that the lender’s role is limited to assisting the borrower in achieving 
the aims it has itself decided and for which it has requested financial assistance. 
Moreover, as argued above, loan agreements usually do not include a link between the 
repayment obligation and the final success of the financial assistance because it is 
recognized that (a) the success of a project entails risks that are usually outside the 
control of lenders, who also face larger risks since they have less information than 
borrowers (so-called “information asymmetry”); (b) such a link would reduce incentives 
for borrowers to make the project a success (since part of the cost of failure would then 
be borne by the lender); and (c) such a feature in loan agreements would give these loans 
an equity, rather than a debt, characteristic. 
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International lenders could nevertheless engage in efforts to ensure that the risks 
of inappropriate use are managed to the extent possible. These could include the 
following: 
•  Covenants in loans could expressly require that the loan proceeds be used for their 
intended purposes, and subsequent supervision efforts, in which the borrower and 
the lender cooperate, should be designed to ensure that proceeds are being used 
for and achieving their intended purposes. 
•  Lending institutions could regularly conduct – together with the sovereign 
borrower’s authorities – evaluations of the use of their loan proceeds and whether 
such loans have achieved their intended purposes. These evaluations may be 
conducted independently of the management of these institutions and the results 
could be made public. 
•  If international lending institutions are aware that they are lending into a high-risk 
environment because the borrowing country’s economic management institutions 
are weak and controls over the use of public resources may be less than adequate, 
then there may be a case for applying even higher standards of probity and more 
stringent safeguards than normal. Of course, there are few objective indicators on 
which such judgments can be based, which makes international lending for 
development purposes highly risky in the first place. 
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Differentiating between official and commercial creditors 
 
Good lending practices of the sort described in this section could apply to official 
as well as commercial creditors. Since the shareholders of official creditors are 
sovereigns, the policies of such financial agencies – bilateral and multilateral – tend to be 
driven by public policy considerations. Shareholders in these institutions tend to apply 
constant pressure to improve lending practices, in part because they are concerned about 
the development impact of the finance provided by these agencies, but also because they 
hear the concerns raised by non-governmental and civil society organizations in their own 
countries as well as in the developing countries. This pressure has led to improved 
lending practices in some official lending institutions, although the room for 
improvement no doubt remains considerable. 
 
One might think that commercial creditors would have less incentive to improve 
lending practices – especially if implementing such practices imposes additional costs. 
But the existence of the Equator Principles suggests otherwise. The Equator Principles 
are a set of ten benchmarks against which 52 of the world’s most prominent commercial 
financial institutions have agreed to determine, measure, and manage the social and 
environmental risks associated with project financing.
39 One of the key motivations for 
this initiative was the perceived importance of mitigating credit and reputational risk – a 
good example of how commercial considerations can potentially lead to socially 
desirable results. Supported by the International Finance Corporation (one of the 
institutions of the World Bank Group), the Equator Principles also facilitate collaboration 
                                            
39   See http://www.equator-principles.com/index.html.  
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and learning between member financial institutions on the interpretation and application 
of broader good-practice lending policies. 
 
Of course, good lending practices, whether by official or commercial lending 
institutions, while important cannot by themselves guarantee the appropriate use of loan 
proceeds for development purposes. The responsibility of achieving this result must 
ultimately rest with the borrower. 
 
Dealing with unsustainable debt stocks 
 
There is little doubt that, if loans become the subject of fraud, embezzlement, or 
corruption, such debts can quickly accumulate to the point that they become 
unsustainable. Proponents of the expanded concept of odious debts would like to see a 
legal basis for the unilateral repudiation of debt stocks if such unsustainable debts were 
found to be odious. But there are other ways to deal with the problem of unsustainable 
debt stocks. 
 
It is important to observe at the outset that, while misused loans can quickly 
accumulate into unsustainable debts, not all unsustainable debts are the result of misused 
loans. Loans can be used well and yet not achieve their desired results simply because 
circumstances can change, the economic environment affecting investments can suddenly 
deteriorate for reasons outside governmental control, natural disasters can strike, or the 
design of the investment itself may have been faulty from the start. When such 
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unforeseeable situations (or “shocks”) occur, debts can accumulate in relation to the 
repayment capacity of the country.
40 
 
 That countries must either pay their unsustainable debts or repudiate them is a 
false dichotomy. In reality, countries have chosen the middle path of restructuring their 
debt when it has become unsustainable. Such restructurings usually involve losses to 
creditors and therefore tend to be the result of prolonged and complex negotiations. But 
they do provide a useful alternative to repudiation that allows borrowing countries to 
maintain good relations with their creditors. Iraq and South Africa are recent examples of 
countries where new governments inherited large sovereign debts but, rather than 
repudiating them, chose instead to negotiate their restructuring with their creditors. 
 
In the case of commercial creditors, debt restructuring negotiations have been 
between the sovereign and creditors’ committees such as the London Club or, as in more 
recent cases, representatives of bondholders. With official creditors, debt restructurings 
have usually taken place in the context of the Paris Club, an informal group of official 
creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to payment 
difficulties experienced by sovereign debtors. The most prominent recent examples of 
large Paris Club debt reduction deals are those for Nigeria and Iraq. 
 
Multilateral creditors are governed by agreed international frameworks on the 
treatment of debt problems in developing countries.
41 Most notable among these are the 
                                            
40   See Kraay and Nehru, “When is External Debt Sustainable?”, The World Bank Economic Review, 
Volume 20, Number 3, 341-65.  
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Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI), which together have provided – and are expected to provide further – 
significant debt reduction to the poorest, most heavily indebted countries of the world. 
These initiatives implicitly recognize that the debts accumulated by the recipient 
countries have reached a point where they cannot be repaid without imposing 
unacceptable hardship on the population.  
 
In addition to participating in international debt reduction initiatives, some 
international lenders have independently and voluntarily forgiven debts they were owed 
by developing countries. The most recent example is that of the Norwegian government 
which, in the 2007 national budget, cancelled, ex gratia and not out of any legal 
obligation, NOK 520 million ($78 million) of official debts owed by Ecuador, Egypt, 
Jamaica, Peru, and Sierra Leone stemming from the Norwegian Ship Export Campaign 
(1976-80). The Norwegian government considered this campaign a development policy 
failure and consequently assumed “shared responsibility” for the debts that followed. 
This debt cancellation is additional to Norway’s ordinary overseas development 
assistance. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
41   There have been a few examples of commercial entities canceling their claims on similar grounds, 
but these have usually been as a result of pressure generated by negative publicity in the media. 
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Dispute resolution 
 
Notwithstanding all the above measures that international lenders or borrowing 
countries can apply, disputes will inevitably arise between lenders and borrowers and 
must be settled. Usually, loan agreements include clauses on the settlement of disputes. 
For loans from commercial creditors to sovereign borrowers, the jurisdiction for the 
settlement of disputes belongs to national courts, such as those of New York or London, 
which may apply laws that protect debtors against litigants, who may be seeking 
repayment in spite of evidence of bribery or “unclean hands” on the part of the lender, or 
of corrupt agents or public officials embezzling state funds under cover of government 
bureaucracy. In the case of loan agreements to which international institutions are parties, 
the settlement of disputes is usually devolved to arbitrators, even though in practice such 
disputes are regularly solved by direct negotiations between the parties, without any need 




Many of the concerns that have been raised by proponents of the expanded 
concept of odious debts have been fueled by moral outrage and the need for a just system 
of international lending to sovereigns. Such concerns can be addressed by improved 
practices of international lenders and sovereign borrowers. Despite some promising steps 
in this direction, much remains to be done. Rather than relying on an elusive, expanded 
concept of odious debts, with the many costs to developing countries that this would 
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entail, it seems more practical to assess what can be done to improve lending and 
borrowing practices at a more quotidian level. This approach has the advantage of 
channeling the valid concerns that underpin the debate on odious debts in constructive 




- Page 38 -  
Select Bibliography
42  
Abrahams, Charles Peter, The Doctrine of “Odious Debts” – LL.M.-Thesis from the 
Rijks Universiteit Leiden, 2002, available at: 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/ApartheidDebtThesis.pdf.  
 
Adams, Patricia, Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World’s 
Environmental Legacy, 1991, excerpts available at: 
www.probeinternational.org/probeint/OdiousDebts/OdiousDebts/index.html.  
 
Adams, Patricia, Iraq’s Odious Debts, 2004, available at: 
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa526.pdf.  
 
Anderson, Kevin H., International Law and State Succession: A Solution to the Iraqi 
Debt Crisis?, Utah Law Review (2005), 401. 
 
Bedjaoui, Mohammed, Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other Than Treaties 





Bonilla, Stephania, A Law-and-Economics Analysis of Odious Debts: History, Trends 
and Debates, November 2006, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=946111. 
 
Bonilla, Stephania, Towards a Solution to Odious Debts and Looking at Creditors’ 
Incentives, July 2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007698. 
 
Buchheit, Lee C. / Gulati, G. Mitu / Thompson, Robert B., The Dilemma of Odious 
Debts, Duke Law Journal 56 (2007), 1201. 
 
Feilchenfeld, Ernst, Public Debts and State Succession, 1931. 
 
Foorman, James L. / Jehle, Michael E., Effects of State and Government Succession on 
Commercial Bank Loans to Foreign Sovereign Borrowers, Univ. Ill. L.R. (1982), 9. 
 
Frankenberg, Günter / Knieper, Rolf, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of 
Developing Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, IBK 
Paper Series No. 12, January 1984. 
 
Garner, James Wilford, Germany’s Responsibility for Austria’s Debts, American 
Journal of International Law 32 (1938), 766. 
 
                                            
42   In selecting the titles listed in the bibliography, the authors of this discussion paper do not express 
any value judgment on them or necessarily agree with their reasoning and conclusions. 
- Page 39 -  
Gelpern, Anna, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, Chicago 
Journal of International Law 6 (2005), 391. 
 
Gruber, Annie, Le droit international de la succession d’états, 1986. 
 
Hanlon, Joseph, Defining “Illegitimate Debt”: When Creditors should be Liable for 
Improper Loans, in Jochnick, Chris / Preston, Fraser A. (eds.), Sovereign Debt at the 
Crossroads – Challenges and Proposals for Resolving the Third World Debt Crisis, 
2006, p. 109. 
 
Hanlon, Joseph, Wolfowitz, the World Bank, and Illegitimate Lending, Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 13 (2007), 41. 
 
Hoeflich, M.H., Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections Upon the History of the 
International Law of Public Debt in Connection With State Succession, Univ. Ill. L.R. 
(1982), 39. 
 
Howse, Robert, “The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law,” UNCTAD 




Jayachandran, Seema / Kremer, Michael, Odious Debt, The American Economic 




Jochnick, Chris, The Legal Case for Debt Repudiation, in Jochnick, Chris / Preston, 
Fraser A. (eds.), Sovereign Debt at the Crossroads – Challenges and Proposals for 
Resolving the Third World Debt Crisis, 2006, p. 132. 
 
Kaiser, Jürgen / Queck, Antje, Odious Debts – Odious Creditors? International Claims 
in Iraq, available at: www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/iraqpaper.pdf.  
 
Khalfan, Ashfaq / King, Jeff / Thomas, Bryan, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine, 
Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL) working paper, 
2003. 
 
King, Jeff A., Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, The North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 32 (2007), 605. 
 
Kraay, Aart and Nehru, Vikram, When is External Debt Sustainable?, World Bank 
Economic Review, Volume 20, Number 3, p. 341. 
 
Kremer, Michael / Jayachandran, Seema, Odious Debt, 2002, available at: 
www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2002/poverty/mksj.pdf.  
- Page 40 -  
 
Lothian, Tamara, The Criticism of the Third-World Debt and the Revision of Legal 
Doctrine, Wisconsin International Law Journal 13 (1994-95), 421. 
 
Ludington, Sarah, and Gulati, Mitu, A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the 
Doctrine of Odious Debts, Virginia Journal of International Law 48 (2008), 595.  
 
Mahmud, Mohammad, Illegitimacy of odious and dubious debt, Pakistan and Gulf 
Economist, No. 22, May 29 – June 4, 2000. 
 
Mancina, Emily F., Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious 
Debt Doctrine in International Law, George Washington International Law Review 
36 (2004), 1239.  
 
Mandel, Stephen, Odious Lending – Debt relief as if morals mattered, nef-publication 
(new economic foundation), available at: 
www.jubileeresearch.org/news/Odiouslendingfinal.pdf.  
 
Marcelli, Fabio, Il debito estero dei paesi in via di sviluppo nel diritto internazionale, 
2004. 
 
Menon, P.K., The Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, State Property, Archives, 
and Debts, 1991. 
 
Michalowski, Sabine, Unconstitutional Regimes and the Validity of Sovereign Debt. A 
Legal Perspective, 2007.  
 
Ochoa, Christiana, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a 
Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, Harvard International Law Journal 49 (2008), 
109.  
 
O’Connell, Daniel Patrick, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, 
vols. I and II, 1967. 
 
Paulus, Christoph G., Odious Debts vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, Brooklyn Journal 
of International Law 31 (2005), 83. 
 
Paulus, Christoph G., The Concept of Odious Debts: A Historical Survey, mimeo., World 
Bank. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram, Odious or Just Malodorous? Why the odious debt proposal is likely to 
stay in cold storage, Finance and Development, December 2004. 
 
Reinisch, August, State Responsibility for Debts – International Law Aspects of External 
Debt and Debt Restructuring, 1995. 
 
- Page 41 -  
- Page 42 - 
Sack, Alexander Nahum, Les Effets des Transformations des États sur leurs dettes 
publìque et autres obligations financières, 1927. 
 
Sack, Alexander Nahum, The Juridical Nature of the Public Debts of States, New York 
University Law Quarterly Review 10 (1932-33), 127 and 341. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Odious rulers, odious debts, The Atlantic Monthly, November 2003, 
available at : 
www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=8577.  
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Ethics, Markets and Government Failures, and Globalization: 
Perspectives on Debt and Finance, in Jochnick, Chris / Preston, Fraser A. (eds.), 
Sovereign Debt at the Crossroads – Challenges and Proposals for Resolving the 
Third World Debt Crisis, 2006, p. 158. 
 
Tamen, Anaïs, La Doctrine de la Dette « Odieuse » ou : L’utilisation du Droit 
International dans les Rapports de Puissance, 2004 (Dissertation présentée le 11 
décembre 2003 lors du 3
ème colloque de Droit International du Comité pour 




Weisburd, A. Mark, Reflections on A Convenient Untruth, Virginia Journal of 
International Law 48 (2008), 641. 
 
Winters, Jeffrey A., Criminal Debt in the Indonesian Context, 2000, available at: 
www.probeinternational.org/pi/documents/odious_debts/Criminal_Debt.html.  
 
Yianni, Andrew / Tinkler, David, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious 
Debts?, The North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 32 (2007), 749. 
 
 
 
 
******* 